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THE IMPOTENT SWORD OF JAPANESE
JUSTICE: THE DOCTRINE OF SHOBUNSEI
AS A BARRIER TO ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION

Robert W. Dziublat

INTRODUCTION
Administrative litigation in Japan began with the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when fundamental changes within the Japanese political
and legal systems began to occur. From a legal viewpoint, the most
significant changes were the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in
1889 and the promulgation of the Civil Code, Commercial Code, and
the Court Organization Law in 1890 and of the Code of Civil Proce-

dure in 1891.1
The Meiji Constitution and the various codes bore a marked German influence. 2 The approach to administrative litigation reflected
this influence through the constitutional establishment of a separate
Administrative Court3 whose jurisdiction was limited to administra-

tive acts. 4 Although the administrative court was abolished after
t Legal Consultant, Tokyo Aoyama Law Office, which is associated with the
international law firm of Baker & McKenzie; Fulbright Graduate Research Fellow,
University of Kyoto, Faculty of Law, 1983-1984; LL.M. (East Asian Law), University of
Washington (1983); J.D., Northwestern University (1980); M.A., University of Chicago
(1978); B.A., Northwestern University (1974).
The author would like to thank Professor John 0. Haley for his comments on an
earlier draft of this article, which was submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of
Master of Law at the University of Washington School of Law.
I. D. HENDERSON & 1. HALEY, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 75-78
(1979 ed.) (unpublished course materials used at the University of Washington; available
through the Cornell International Law Journal).
2. For a more complete discussion of the reception of western law into Japan, see
Mukai & Toshitani, The Progressand Problems of Compiling the Civil Code in the Early
Meiji Era, 1 LAW IN JAPAN 25 (1967).
3. MEn CONST. art. 61 (1889).
4. The Japanese term "administrative acts" (gydsei kii) came from the German
Verwaltungsakt, "a term of art that excluded all informal nonbinding actions by administrative officials regardless of their illegality or injury." J. Haley, Postwar Developments in
Japanese Administrative Law: The Failure of the Occupation Reforms 6 (1983) (unpublished manuscript; on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
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World War II, this jurisdictional limitation to an administrative act,
which is now usually referred to as a shobun (disposition), persisted.
It is also called the doctrine of shobunsei, "in the nature of a
''5
disposition.
The hypothesis of this article is that the Japanese legal system
uses the shobunsei doctrine as a tool to delay judicial review of administrative actions until a time when any review would be futile. Section
I of the article outlines the development of modem Japanese administrative litigation law. Section II describes the format and operation of
the Administrative Case Litigation Law (Gyiseifiken soshi ho-), 6 giving particular emphasis to the courts' analysis in determining whether
a justiciable shobun exists.
Section III analyzes two problems that can result from the
shobunsei doctrine. The first problem is that individual rights may
suffer because by the time judicial review is allowed, the court is faced
with afait accompli that it is unwilling to undo. The second problem
is that the delay in judicial review of administrative actions causes
administrative agency personnel to develop increased bureaucratic
insularity. Instead of working for the interests of the citizens whom
they are supposed to serve, agency personnel work to further their
personal goals within the goal-oriented framework that the agency
itself has developed and that itself is unresponsive to public demand.
Section IV compares two possible solutions to the problems
shobunsei causes. The first solution is to use the State Redress Law
(Kokka baishiho)7 as a means of indirect judicial review of administrative action. The second solution is to expand the notion of shobunsei to allow for judicial review at a stage of administrative action when
that action is neither set in stone nor obfuscated by possible bureaucratic cover-ups. This second solution draws upon the American leg5. Perhaps the most widely used definition ofshobun is that proposed by Jiro Tanaka,
former professor of law at the University of Tokyo and a justice of the Supreme Court from
1964 until 1973. Tanaka states that an administrative disposition (gydsei shobun), which is
simply the positive-law equivalent of an administrative action (gydsei kil), is "an action
performed by an administrative agency, as an exercise of its power of control or superior
intention, in order to regulate a given concrete legal relationship." J. TANAKA, GY6SEIH6
TAI-I (AN OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW) 65 (1950). Although many Japanese

courts and commentators translate shobunsei as "ripeness" because of its similarity to the
American administratrive law doctrine, this comparison is somewhat misleading, for
shobunsei is a very demanding standard that causes the dismissal of many lawsuits that
would probably proceed in the United States. See Upham, After Minamota: CurrentProspects and Problems in JapaneseEnvironmental Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213, 235 n.72
(1979).
6. Law No. 139 of 1962 (English translation in 5 EiBUN H6REI SHA (EHS) No. OB
2391). Because this author often disagrees with the EHS translation, the author's own
translations of relevant provisions of the ACLL are noted throughout this Article.
7. Law No. 125 of 1947; see J. Haley, supra note 4, at 20-21.
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islative and judicial responses

to the behavior of American

administrative agencies.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION LAW

In August 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies, and from September 2, 1945, until April 28, 1952, the Allies formally administered
Japan. The instrument of surrender provided that "the authority of
the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be

subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will
take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of
'8
surrender."
One of the first steps the Supreme Commander took "to effectuate
these terms of surrender" was to draft a new constitution and to
rewrite the various legal codes to conform with the new constitution. 9
The new Constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and put

into effect on May 3, 1947.10 Chapter VI of the Constitution outlines
the role of the judiciary within the new governmental system. Article

76 attempts to assure an independent judiciary.
The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as are established by law.
No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or
agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.
All judges shall be independent in the exercise ofI I their conscience and
shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.

Article 78 further safeguards the separation of the judiciary from
the executive: "Judges shall not be removed except by public
impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges
8. R. WARD, JAPAN'S POLmCAL SYSTEM 19-20 (2d

ed.

1978).

9. For a full discussion of the legal reform in occupied Japan, see A. OPPLER, LEGAL
REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN (1976).

10. The Constitution, in fact, had secretly been drafted by the Government Section of
the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) after it had become evident that the
Japanese government needed guidance and assistance to produce a document that would
embody the essentials of democratic government. H. QUIGLEY & J. TURNER, THE NEW
JAPAN 93-94 (1956). Whether this Constitution was "imposed" by SCAP on Japan is a
subject of disagreement. Compare H. QUIGLEY & J. TURNER, supra, at 94 (the Japanese in
reality could not reject a document drafted and endorsed by SCAP) with Williams, Making
the JapaneseConstitution: A FurtherLook, 1965 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 665 (SCAP's suggestions and guidance do not equal imposition). In any event, there is general agreement that
"[o]ne of the primary aims of the postwar Japanese Constitution and related legal reforms
under the Allied Occupation was to create an institutional structure within which administrative officials would be held accountable for their actions." J. Haley, supra note 4, at 1.
The methods chosen included parliamentary supremacy and judicial review. Id. at 7. For
a more detailed description of the methods, see A. OPPLER, supra note 9, at 86-104.
11. JAPAN CONST. art. 76.
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shall be administered by any executive organ or agency." 12
The most immediate consequence of these constitutional provisions upon the Japanese administrative litigation system was the abolition of the Administrative Court and the grant to the judicial courts of
the competency to review administrative actions. 13 This was achieved

through the promulgation of the Administrative Litigation Special
Measures Law.14 Article 1 of the new law provided that administra-

tive suits would be treated procedurally as ordinary civil actions.1 5
Article 2 established the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
appeals. 16 This law, according to one commentator, would bring a
remarkable change in Japanese administrative law.
Now the revolutionary principle was established that the legality-not the
expediency or discretion-of any administrative act could be challenged in the
regular courts, where the rules of civil procedure were to apply. This protection of the citizen from violation of the law
by the executive branch goes
17
beyond that granted in most Western states.

The Administrative Litigation Special Measures Law, however
failed to achieve revolutionary results. The law limited the courts'
capacity to give effective relief from illegal administrative action.

First, under article 11, "the courts were required to dismiss all suits if,
despite the illegality of the action under review, the relief would be
against the public interest."' 8 Because the courts were free to define
the "public interest" and to determine whether a particular case war-

ranted dismissal, this article did not significantly restrict judicial oversight. Second, under article 11, filing an appeal to the courts did not
automatically suspend the execution of the administrative action at
issue under article 10(1). 19 Thus, any challenged administrative conduct could continue, regardless of its possible illegality, unless the
12. Id. at art. 78.
13. From 1946 until 1948, the courts heard administrative cases under the Code of
Civil Procedure (CCP), which was promulgated in 1890. This procedure did not last long,
however, because administrative cases differ from civil cases in many important respects;
the CCP was not entirely suitable to the conduct of administrative cases. K. Machii, The
Japanese System of Judicial Review: Its Organization and Procedure 262 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California, Los Angeles; on file at the offices
of the Cornell International Law Journal). "[A] few scholars insist that the new Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of a system of administrative courts alongside the
judicial courts. . . ." Hashimoto, The Rule of Law: Some Aspects of JudicialReview of
Administrative Action, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
239, 241 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
14. Administrative Litigation Special Measures Law (Gyisei soshd tokurei ho), Law
No. 81 of 1948.
15. Id. at art. 1.
16. Id.at art. 2. This discussion is based upon J. Haley, supra note 4, at 12-15.
17. A. OPPLER, supra note 9, at 134.
18. J. Haley, supra note 4, at 12-13; Administrative Litigation Special Measures Law,
art. 11.
19. Administrative Litigation Special Measures Law, art. 10(1), 11.
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court suspended execution of the conduct under article 10(2).20 Such
a suspension, however, could be granted only in the case of "urgent
necessity to prevent irreparable damage," and the Prime Minister
could still override a court decision to suspend execution if the delay
in effecting the administrative action was deemed to have a "material
'21
influence on the public interest.
Other, more serious problems also remained.
The Special Measures Law lacked any provision delineating what relief the
courts could give once an administrative action was found to be illegal. Nor
did the statute define what actions could be reviewed. . . . For lack of new or
broader definitions of judicial power Japanese22courts could only fall back on
the restrictive concepts of the prewar system.

The Special Measures Law was repealed in 1962 and replaced with the
Administrative Case Litigation Law (ACLL),2 3 which "codified the

prevailing concepts and doctrines without, needless to say, expanding
the notion of judicial power or the reviewability of less formal admin'24
istrative measures."
II. FORMAT AND OPERATION OF THE ACLL
Articles 1 through 6 of the ACLL establish the scope of the
ACLL. Article 1 states that the ACLL shall govern. "administrative
case litigation" (gyseifiken sosho) unless special provisions in other
laws exclude such application. 2 5 Articles 2 through 6 of the ACLL
20. Id. at art. 10(2).
21. J. Haley, supra note 4, at 13.
The Administrative Procedure Act provides an interesting contrast:
When an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone the effective date
of action taken by it, pending judicial review. On such conditions as may be
required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing
court, including the court to which a case may be taken on appeal.. . may issue
all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency
action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
5 U.S.C. § 705 (1982).
Particularly interesting in this section is the disparity between the agency standard and
the judicial standard for postponing the effective date of administrative action. The agency
"may postpone" the effective date when "justice so requires," while the court's standard is
"irreparable injury." Thus, the agency, which has a vested interest in not postponing its
own actions, may do so if justice requires it to do so-a remarkable allowance of agency
discretion. The court, on the other hand, can postpone administrative action only if the
aggrieved party can show irreparable injury-a very demanding burden of proof. In the
end, the reasonable conclusion may well be that little difference exists between the Japanese
and American systems in this regard, even under the Administrative Case Litigation Law
(ACLL) (Gyiseifiken soshi ho), Law No. 139 of 1962, which is largely unchanged in this
area. See infra text accompanying note 99.
22. J. Haley, supra note 4, at 13-14.
23. See supra note 6.
24. J. Haley, supra note 4, at 14.
25. ACLL, art. 1. The constitutional support for this provision is article 32 of the
Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be denied the right of access to the
courts." JAPAN CONST. art. 32. The statutory support is provided by article 3 of the
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define the term "administrative case litigation, ' 26 establishing three
basic types of lawsuits in which administrative actions can be challenged: (1) suits in which a private party-either an interested party
in a kikoku lawsuit or a disinterested party in a public lawsuit-seeks
judicial relief from administrative dispositions, decisions, or inaction,
or from the nonconformity of state or local actions with the law; (2)
suits in which two private parties sue each other on the basis of a legal
relationship that has arisen between them by reason of an administrative disposition or decision;27 and (3) intergovernmental disputes
between state agencies over their respective powers.
Courts Act (Saibanshoho),Law No. 59 of 1947 (English translation in 2(1) EHS No. 2010),
which declares that (1) "Courts shall, except as expressly provided for in the Constitution
of Japan, decide all legal disputes and shall possess such other powers as are specifically
provided for by law. (2) The provisions of the preceeding paragraph shall in no way prevent preliminary determinations by administrative agencies."
26. ACLL, art. 2-6 (author's translation).
Article 2. Administrative case litigation. In this Law, "administrative case litigation" shall mean a kikoku appeal lawsuit, a party lawsuit, a public lawsuit, or an
agency lawsuit.
Article 3. KMkoku appeallawsuits. In this Law, "kkoku appeal lawsuit" shall
mean a lawsuit of exception [fufuku] to the exercise of public power by an administrative agency.
(2) In this Law, "lawsuit for revocation of disposition" shall mean a lawsuit that
seeks the revocation of conduct constituting an administrative disposition or other
exercise of public power (excluding such decision, ruling, or other act prescribed in
the following paragraph; hereinafter simply referred to as "disposition").
(3) In this Law, "lawsuit for revocation of decision" shall mean a lawsuit seeking the revocation of an administrative decision, ruling, or other action (hereinafter
simply referred to as "decision") on a petition for review, petition of objection, or
other petition of exception (hereinafter simply referred to as "petition for review").
(4) In this Law, "lawsuit for affirmation of nullity" shall mean a lawsuit seeking
the affirmation of either the existence or nonexistence, or the validity or invalidity,
of a disposition or decision.
(5) In this Law, "lawsuit for the affirmation of illegality of forebearance" shall
mean a lawsuit seeking an affirmation of the illegality of an administrative agency's
failure to make a disposition of or decision on a petition that is based on the law
within a considerable period of time, even though the agency should make some
disposition or decision with regard thereto.
Article 4. Party litigation. In this Law, "party lawsuit" shall mean a lawsuit
concerning a disposition or decision that affirms or constitutes a legal relationship
between parties, by which lawsuit one of the parties is made a defendant pursuant
to provisions of law or pursuant to a public law legal relationship.
Article 5. Public litigation In this Law, "public lawsuit" shall mean a lawsuit
brought by a qualified voter or other personally and legally disinterested party
seeking to correct the actions of a State or public body agency not in conformity
with provisions of law.
Article 6. Agency litigation. In this Law, "agency lawsuit" shall mean a lawsuit
concerning disputes between State or public body agencies over the existence or
nonexistence of the relative power between them, or the exercise of such power.
27. An example would be when a purchaser of land from the state is sued by a party
claiming that he legally owned the land and that the state had wrongfully expropriated the
land from him before selling it to the defendant.
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ABILITY OF COURTS

To

ENJOIN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Before the enactment of the ACLL in 1962, there was some confusion as to whether private citizens could obtain injunctive relief
against administrative action. 28 In the early days of post-World War
II Japan, legal scholars and the courts decided that injunctions and
mandamus suits compelling the government to do or to refrain from
doing specified actions were impermissible. 29 Accordingly, these suits
were usually dismissed 3o and then replaced by declaratory judgment
actions. Although declaratory judgments initially found little favor in
the courts, 31 they eventually gained acceptance. 32 Likewise, injunc33
tion suits experienced an increased popularity.
The ACLL attempts to clarify this confusion in two ways. First,
article 44 eliminates the provisional disposition remedy of the Code of
Civil Procedure: "The provisional disposition (kari shobun) provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are impermissible with regard to
administrative dispositions or other acts comprising an exercise of the
public power."' 34 In order to compensate for this elimination of the
provisional disposition remedy, article 25 of the ACLL provides,
In cases where a suit for revocation of a disposition has been filed, when it is
urgently necessary to prevent a loss which is produced by a disposition, the
execution of a disposition, or the continuation of procedure and which is difficult to restore, the court may, upon application and by way of a ruling, suspend in whole or in part the effect of a disposition, its execution, or the
continuance35 of procedure (hereinafter referred to as "suspension of
execution")

Article 25(3) limits the availability of this remedy by declaring that it
shall not be granted when it significantly influences the public welfare
28. K. Machii, supra note 13, at 267-69.
29. Id. at 266.
30. See, e.g., Kimura v. Governor of Tokyo-to, 4 Gy6sai reishfi 2174 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.
Sept. 16, 1953) (suit for injunction dismissed); City of Osaka v. Governor of Osaka-fu, 2
Gy6sai reishii 1403 (Osaka Dist. Ct. July 7, 1951) (mandamus action dismissed). See also
K. Machii, supra note 13, at 266.
31. See, eg., Kud6 v. Ministry of Justice, Fukushima Dist. Chief, 5 Gy6sai reishii 1528
(Sendai High Ct. June 29, 1954); Kawakami v. Mayor of Fukuoka, 4 Gy6sai reishfi 2477
(Fukuoka Dist. Ct. Mar. 11, 1954).
32. See, eg., Son-to Ya v. Japan, 13 Gy6sai reishii 1831 (Osaka High Ct. Oct. 19,
1962); Iso Medical Found. Dispensary v. Japan, 6 Gy6sai reishfi 1193 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.
May 26, 1955).
33. See, eg,Kinoshita v. Warden of Fuchia Penitentiary, 14 Gy6sai reishid 1316 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct. July 29, 1963); Ueno v. Tokyo Dist. Procurator's Office, 13 Gy6sai reishii 2393
(Tokyo Dist. Ct. Dec. 25, 1962).
34. ACLL, art. 44 (author's translation). The provisional disposition to which Article
44 refers is similar to the preliminary injunction in U.S. law. The provisional disposition is
delineated in articles 755 to 761 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In essence, article 755
authorizes the courts to grant a provisional disposition when it is necessary to protect the
material existence of the right in issue.
35. ACLL, art. 25(2) (author's translation).
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or when the reasons for the suit are not apparent. 36
Second, article 27(1) limits the courts' ability to suspend a shobun
37
by granting the Prime Minister power to quash a court's suspension.
This power is broad. Although article 27(1) of the ACLL simply
states that the Prime Minister "can" state his objections to a judicial
suspension of a shobun, subparagraph 4 of the same article declares
that when the Prime Minister has made his objection, the court shall
not suspend the execution of the shobun or, if it has already done so,
shall cancel the suspension. 38 In short, the Prime Minister has unfettered discretion to reverse a judicial determination that an adminstrative disposition should be suspended pending a final decision on the
merits. The Prime Minister has not been reluctant to exercise his
39
discretion.
B.

SUITS FOR REVOCATION AND FOR AFFIRMATION OF NULLITY:
THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SHOBUN

The primary type of lawsuit questioning an administrative action
is a kkoku suit, which seeks a revocation of "conduct constituting an
administrative disposition or other exercise of public power" under
article 3(2) of the ACLL. The key issue in all such cases is whether
the agency action constitutes "an administrative disposition or other
exercise of public power" or is simply factual or proprietary behavior
not directly related to questions of public law. Because the administrative and civil sections of each district court are separate, if the contested action is deemed to be a shobun or an exercise of public power,
the ACLL applies and any civil action that has been filed must be
dismissed. "[R]eliance on the wrong form of action means that plaintiffs risk not only application of private or public law doctrines that
they would rather avoid, but also the dismissal of the entire case with
an implied reference to the other section." 4 Thus, a plaintiff could
substantially prejudice his own case by characterizing the contested
41
administrative action incorrectly.
36. d at art. 25(3).
37. Id. at art. 27(l)(4).
38. Id
39. See, eg,, Fukuda v. President of Kyoto Prefecture Medical Univ., I Gy6sai reishii
764 (Kyoto Dist. Ct. July 19, 1950) (the Prime Minister quashed the Kyoto District
Court's injunction prohibiting the President of the Medical School from expelling protesting students).
40. See Upham, supra note 5, at 229.
41. Another difficulty that aggrieved parties face in challenging a shobun-one that
also inheres in determining the presence of a shobun-is the limitation imposed by article 9
of the ACLL, which limits the availability of suits for revocation of disposition and of
decision to persons having a legal interest with respect to seeking the revocation. Article 9
is a standing provision that, although statutorily distinct from the shobun language of article 3(2), involves many of the same issues as the shobun cases.
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The seminal case setting the scope of the shobunsei rule is
Hayashi Ken Shipbuilding Co. v. Director of High Seas Accidents
Inquiry Board,42 an en banc decision of the Supreme Court under the
Administrative Litigation Special Measures Law. This case involved a
finding by the defendant Board that the cause of an accident on the
high seas between two Japanese ships was the plaintiffs inadequate
inspection and repair of a rudder. The plaintiff had not been a party to
the Board's hearings nor had it had an opportunity to present any
evidence or to express any opinion to the Board. After the findings
were announced, the plaintiff brought suit to have them revoked.
The Tokyo High Court held that the Board had violated the principle of "no hearing, no judgment" and thus had violated the plaintiff's
rights. On appeal by the Board, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that:
The decision [by the Board] is a decision clarifying the cause of the above
maritime accident. That it does not impose any duties whatsoever on the
appellee or hinder any exercise of appellee's rights is clear from the provisions
of the law and the decision itself. As stated below, it does not have the effect of
a binding determination of the appellee's negligence. This being the case, the
decision does not have a direct effect on the appellee's rights and duties; thus it
cannot be considered to be an administrative disposition and we must hold that
the appellee is not allowed to file suit.43

By American standards, this definition of justiciability is terribly
restrictive. Nonetheless, this interpretation of shobun has largely been
followed. For example, in Sasaki v. Atami City AgriculturalCouncil,44
the Supreme Court considered a notice from the defendant to the
plaintiff concerning the boundaries of the plaintiff's farm. In holding
that the notice did not qualify as a shobun, because it had no legal
effect and because it did not affect the scope of the plaintiffs ownership right in his farmland, the court declared that a shobun is an "official action which forms the rights and duties of the citizens or
confirms the scope thereof." 45 The effect of the Sasaki rule is that
supervisory orders, permissions, approvals, and regulations among
agencies or within a single agency cannot be the object of litigation
because they do not directly create or form the rights and duties of
citizens.4 6 One scholar notes that "this type of administrative act,
42. 15 Minshii 467 (Sup. Ct., G.B. Mar. 15, 1953). For an English-language discussion
of this case, see J. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law (1976) (unpublished and
unpaginated course materials used at the University of Washington School of Law in spring
1983 available through the Cornell International Law Journal); Nathanson & Fujita, The
Right to Fair Hearing in JapaneseAdministrative Law, 45 WASH. L. REv. 273, 279-81
(1970).
43. 15 Minshil at 470.
44. 9 Minshii 217 (Sup. Ct., Ist P.B. Feb. 24, 1955).
45. Iad at 218.
46. Upham, supra note 5, at 236.
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termed 'internal behavior,' is beyond judicial scrutiny. Only when the
agency order is actually applied to individuals' rights and duties, can
the action be challenged through an administrative suit." 47
A recent famous case illustrating the Sasaki rule is Edogawa
4 8 popularly known as the Narita
Ward v. Minister of Transportation,
Shinkansen case.4 9 In that case, the Minister of Transportation published the Ministry's formal plan to extend the Japanese National
Railway's bullet train, or shinkansen, from Tokyo to Narita, the site of
Tokyo's new airport. The Japan Railway Construction Corporation,
which was to do the construction, subsequently submitted its construction implementation plan to the Minister, and the Minister
approved it two days later. The plan included a map that designated
within 200 meters where the track was to be laid.
Plaintiffs, who lived within the designated area, filed suit under
article 3(2) of the ACLL to have the plan revoked. They contended
that they would most likely have to give up their land and that, even if
their property escaped condemnation, they would suffer severe physical and psychological harm from noise and vibration. 50
The Tokyo District Court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground
that the plan was still too nebulous for its approval to qualify as a
shobun.
At the stage of the approval of a Construction Implementation Plan, it has not
necessarily been concretely confirmed who will in the future become an interested party when the Plan is executed. In that sense, a Construction Implementation Plan and its official approval must be considered as abstract in
nature. In other words, that approval is unlike a concrete disposition directed
at a specified individual. Furthermore, there is no provision that requires its
publication, and it itself has no effect whatsoever on citizens' rights and
51
duties.

The court also noted that those plaintiffs whose land would eventually
be taken for the railroad could challenge the shobun designating their
land for expropriation. This remedy, declared the court, would be
"entirely adequate. '5 2 The court failed to state what remedy, if any,
would be available to plaintiffs whose property would not be con47. Id A host of cases, particularly in the construction area, provide concrete examples of the above analysis. See, e.g., Sakamoto v. Governor of Tokyo Prefecture, 20 Minshii
271 (Sup. Ct., G.B. Feb. 23, 1966) (in which the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit, brought by suburban residents challenging a revised renewal plan, because the plan
was not a concrete disposition affecting specific individuals but rather was "nothing more
than a blueprint"). This case is described in J. Haley, supra note 42.
48. 691 Hanreijih6 7 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Dec. 23, 1972), affid, 722 Hanreijihb 52 (Tokyo
High Ct. Oct. 24, 1973).
49. See, eg., Upham, supra note 5, at 236-38. The following discussion is based in part
on this source.
50. 691 Hanrei jiho at 7.
51. Id at 12. This translation is from Upham, supra note 5, at 237.
52. 691 Hanreijih5 at 12.
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demned but who nonetheless would be affected by the construction
and operation of the new line. Viewed in another light, the Minister's
approval according to the court was "internal behavior" directed at
the construction corporation and authorizing it to proceed according
to the plan. Thus, the plan did not affect a citizen's concrete rights
and duties, and, therefore, it lacked ripeness (seijukuse} 5 3 In short,
the court said that judicial review will be delayed until an administrative policy is actually implemented rather than when it is announced
or planned.
A case in which an individual was the direct object of administrative action from which he suffered a detrimental effect, but in which he
still was unsuccessful in court, was Nakamoto v. Governor of Tochigi
Prefecture.54 There the defendant governor sent an admonition
(kaikoku) to Dr. Nakamoto because he "filed a claim against the
social insurance fund for payment in excess of the amount to which he
was entitled."'55 The doctor sued for revocation of this admonition.
Although the Utsunomiya District Court entered judgment in his
favor because the admonition "could exert a factually significant influence" 5 6 on his honor and reputation, the Tokyo High Court reversed
on the merits, and the Supreme Court dismissed the subsequent
jffkoku appeal. The Supreme Court noted that repeated violations of
the rules may lead to revocation of a doctor's commission as a social
insurance physician, and such a revocation would be a shobun under
article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Special Measures Law. An
admonition itself, however, had no legal effect, even though "[i]t is
undeniable that the admonition . . .will have a detrimental effect
upon the plaintiff's reputation."5 7 Thus, the Court dismissed the suit.
Another case in which the plaintiff undoubtedly suffered a detriment but still was not able to seek redress under the ACLL is Kubota
53. Iad As the court declared:
The approval in this case can be viewed not only as the defendant's endorsement of
the... fundamental provisions concerning the construction of the Narita Line,
but also as authorization given to the Japan Railway Construction Corporation to
proceed with construction based on the Plan. It is therefore internal behavior
directed at the above Corporation and cannot be said to be a concrete disposition
directed at any private citizen or to have any influence whatsoever on citizens'
rights or duties. As a legal case, therefore, it lacks the ripeness necessary for a
controversy.
Id
54. 17 Minshii 682 (Utsunomiya Dist. Ct. May 28, 1957), rev'd, 17 Minshii 690 (Tokyo
High Ct. Mar. 14, 1961), afl'd, 17 Minshil 670 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B. June 4, 1963). Excerpts
from the Supreme Court's opinion are translated in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM,
INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 389 (H. Tanaka ed. 1976).
55. 17 Minshfi at 686; THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM supra note 54, at 389.
56. 17 Minshii at 686.
57. THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 54, at 389.
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v. Mayor of Chiyoda Village.58 In Kubota, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking the revocation of orders transferring them to other locations. The
three plaintiffs were employees in the Chiyoda Village Office.5 9 Under
the Local Public Personnel Act, 60 the defendant Mayor had the power
of appointment over the plaintiffs. The Mayor exercised this power
and detached the plaintiffs from the Chiyoda Village Office and reassigned them to the environmental sanitation facilities unions in three
separate cities. On the same day, the management of the receiving
union appointed Kubota as the secretary and chief clerk to the Plans
and General Affairs Section, as well as chief clerk for garbage collections. Imada and Ozawa retained their former positions but in a new
city. The plaintiffs requested an explanation from the mayor of his
reasons for the detachment disposition, which the plaintiffs considered
to be disadvantageous, but the mayor refused the request. On November 2, the Fairness Commission, the political organ competent to
review plaintiffs' statements of dissatisfaction about disadvantageous
positions, also denied the plaintiffs' request for a revocation of the
mayor's disposition. The plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the disposition was illegal because it was an abuse of the mayor's personnel
power.
The court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the transfer order
was not a shobun. The court stated that because the mayor's detachment order could not be separated from the subsequent hiring by the
new agency, the order was not an independent disposition.
[T]he order of detachment simply is nothing more than an action giving notice
to the employee concerned, the purport of which is that one appointing author-

ity consents to the appointment made by another appointing authority. That
notice of the shift of the employee in question to the later organization, by

itself, is not an independent administrative disposition. It is not something that
produces a direct legal effect on the employee in question. (The action by the
later organization's appointing authorities appointing
someone to a new office
61
is a disposition subject to a lawsuit for revocation.)

In sum, although the plaintiffs were transferred by the mayor of the
village in which they worked because of alleged personal ill-will, they
could not have his detachment order revoked because it was not an
"independently completed appointment action." Rather, it was simply his acquiescence to appointments by the agencies for which the
plaintiffs ended up working. Thus, the lawsuit against the mayor had
58. 992 Hanrei jih6 41 (Maebashi Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 1980), kiso appeal filed.
59. Until October 1977, plaintiff Kubota was the section chief of the Residents Section,
plaintiff Imada was a technical officer working as a garbage truck driver, and plaintiff
Ozawa was a garbage man.
60. Local Public Personnel Act (Chih6 kdmuin h), Law No. 261 of 1950.
61. 992 Hanrei jih6 at 44.
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to be dismissed. 62
1.

The Distinction Between the Existence of a Shobun and a Private
Law Action

The civil law system divides law primarily into public law and
private law. 63 Private law traditionally has been that area of the law in
which the sole function of government is the recognition and enforcement of private rights.64 In contrast, public law is that area of law in
which the effectuation of the public interest by state action is the driv65
ing consideration.
Public law thus defined has two major components. The first is
constitutional law, which establishes the governmental structure; the
second is administrative law, which defines the government's relations
with private individuals.6 6 In contrast to private legal relations, in
which the parties are equals and the state acts as referee, in public
legal relations the state is a party, which, as representative of the pub67
lic interest, is superior to the private individual.
A corollary assumption accompanying this general dichotomy
between public law and private law is that the economy functions in a
fairly simple fashion, with private individuals as the principal actors
and with the appropriate sphere of government activity severely limited. 68 This assumption contemplates neither government participation in the economic and social life of the nation nor concerted activity
by associations of individuals, such as corporations or labor unions.
One scholar noted that such an assumption is based on the proposition
that the "only actors in the legal universe [are] the private individual
and the state, and each [has] its domain: private law for one and pub69
lie law for the other."
The relation of this public law-private law distinction to a court's
determination of whether a shobun exists can be seen in Nagasugi v.
62. Not all Japanese courts, however, take such a rigid position on the shobunsei
requirement. See, eg., Yamaguchi v. Minister of Transport., 692 Hanrei jih5 30 (Hiroshima Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 1973) (holding, on policy grounds, that plaintiff had standing to
sue the Minister of Transportation for allegedly unfair bus fare ihereases); Umehara v.
Japan, 20 Minshii 1227 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Oct. 24, 1962), affid, 20 Minshii 1234 (Tokyo
High Ct. Apr. 26, 1963), afl'd, 20 Minshii 1217 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 20, 1965) (denying a
motion to dismiss suit contesting a self-executing statute which terminated plaintiff's right
to operate his drug store). Both Yamaguchi and Umeharaare notable for their recognition
that a citizen's legal rights may be affected before a shobun occurs and that such a result
should be subject to judicial review.
63. J. MERRYMAN, THE CrWL LAW TRADITION 99 (1969).
64. Id. at 100.
65. Id. at 101.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id at 100.
69. Id.
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Governor of Fukui Prefecture.70 In Nagasugi, defendant Tanaka, the
governor of Fukui Prefecture, decided to make a capital loan under
the Small- and Medium-size Enterprise Promotion Trade Group
Law7 1 and the Small- and Medium-size Retail Commerce Promotion
Law72 to the Jinmei Shopping Center Cooperative Association. The
plaintiff, who was a resident of the prefecture, sought to have the loan
decision revoked on various grounds as an illegal shobun.
The court dismissed the suit because there was no shobun. The
court first noted that since neither a right to receive nor a legal interest
in a capital loan is generally granted to applicants for a loan under the
capital loan regulations, even a rejection of the loan application does
not cause any change whatsoever in the legal position of loan applicants. The court thus concluded that the governor's notice of his decision on the loan could not qualify as a shobun but was actionable
73
under private law.
Although the court failed to explain clearly its distinction
between a private law action and a shobun, it is evident that the distinction was the basis of the court's decision. The court reasoned that
because the governor's loan approval did not change anyone's legal
rights or duties-for no one had a right to receive nor a legal interest
in the capital loan at issue-no shobun existed. If no governmental
action existed, public law was inapplicable. And because public law
was inapplicable, the substantive and procedural rules of administrative law could not apply. Therefore, according to the court, the only
other law that could apply was private law, even though the plaintiff
lacked any private law remedy comparable to the one for revocation of
a shobun.74 In short, the court's decision left the plaintiff with no avenue to challenge the governor's approval of the loan.
70. 991 Hanrei jih5 64 (Fukui Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 1980).
71. Small- and Medium-size Enterprise Promotion Trade Group Law (Chthd kigy5
shinkJigyd dan ho), Law No. 56 of 1967.
72. Small- and Medium-size Retail Commerce Promotion Law (Cht~hJ kouri sh6gyd
shinki ho), Law No. 101 of 1973.
73. 991 Hanreijih6 at 68. In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the chain of
administrative procedures set forth in the appendix to the capital loan regulations was particularly persuasive in countering the argument that a further decision on the loan, after the
initial decision, would be a justiciable shobun.
74. Although article 1 of the Civil Code states that "[n]o abuse of rights is permitted,"
and even assuming that the plaintiff in Nagasugicould convince the court that the governor
had abused the plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff would essentially be limited to monetary damages, because the Japanese judiciary lacks the injunctive and contempt powers that U.S.
courts enjoy. See Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,4 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 359,
387 (1978) (remedies available in civil suits are specific performance, damages, and declaratory judgments affirming the legal relations of the litigants).
It would be difficult for the plaintiff in Nagasugi to persuade the court in his favor on an
abuse of rights theory because the Japanese courts have traditionally applied this doctrine
only in riparian rights cases and in real property cases in which a party has encroached on
an adjoining landowner's property rights. See, Aoyama, Wagakuni ni okeru kenri ranyj

1985]

SHOBUNSEI IN JAPANESE LAW

The reasoning behind this result is less than satisfactory. First,
although the court may well be correct in its anaylsis that loan applicants like those at bar had no legal right to receive nor an interest in
the loan, it failed to consider the the plaintiff's position. It was the
plaintiff's legal rights and duties that were being asserted, not those of
loan applicants. Simply to sidestep any consideration of the effect of
the governor's loan decision on the plaintiff's legal rights and duties by
saying that the legal rights and duties of loan applicants in general are
unaffected by that decision is to ignore the very core of the suit.
Another deficiency in the court's reasoning is its cryptic invocation of the public law-private law distinction in its determination that
a governmental action, justiciable only in the public law realm, had
not occurred. Stated simply, the court reasoned that because there
was no public law action, public law could not apply and, thus, ipso
facto the loan approval was a private law action. The language and
reasoning in the opinion suggest that the court was flustered by having
to decide whether a loan transaction involving the government was
cognizable in a public law suit because loans were historically private
law matters and, as such, should be governed by private law.
Although this indecision is understandable given the historical
longevity of the public law-private law distinction, the court was
remiss in not addressing the problem more directly. Moreover, the
traditional dichotomy between public and private law evolved in a far
less complex society. However valid that distinction may have been
when the systematic and conceptually logical theories of civil law were
being formulated, the distinction is less valid today. 75 Although the
public law-private law distinction had logical and factual validity in
the European legal systems of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries,
it is less valid today. As one scholar has stated, "Such terms as public
law and private law do not import any given meaning; their meaning is
supplied by the culture of a given time and place. This truism has
been underlined by both those who attack and those who defend tradiriron no hatten (The development of the abuse of rights theory in Japan), in 1 KENRi No
RANY6 (ABusE OF RIGHTS) 9 (Suekawa commemorative ed. 1962).

75. Perhaps the most important factor undermining the continued vitality of the
dichotomy is the way in which governments have changed during the past century and a
half. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 63, at 102-05. The social state of the twentieth century
has replaced the individualistic state of the nineteenth century. As a result, not only has
the area of private autonomy decreased, but the area of state involvement in the economy
has increased. State entities and state-controlled corporations increasingly engage in commercial and industrial activities using the legal forms of private law. Thus, as the privatelaw realm is decreasing from the standpoint of the individual because of enlarged notions of
the "social function" of property and other private rights, the state is increasingly becoming involved in the private law realm because of the growing activity of the state's commercial entities. The net result is that "[iln so complicated a legal universe, simple dichotomies
like public law and private law seem to lose their utility." Id at 104.
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tional conceptions. '76
Another factor undercutting the rationale for the dismissal in
Nagasugi, and one that is more true of Japan than other civil law
countries, is the abolition of the Administrative Court and the constitutional prohibition against special tribunals. In the civil law system,
the separation of powers doctrine necessitated the existence of two sets
of courts, the administrative courts and the civil courts. 77 Public law
questions were adjudicated by administrative courts and private law
questions by civil courts. The postwar establishment of a unitary Japanese judiciary with jurisdiction over both private law and public law
issues has reduced the significance of the separation of powers doctrine
78
and has probably blurred the public law-private law distinction.
Despite these infirmities in the public law-private law distinction,
the Nagasugi court ultimately relied on this theory for its finding that
there was no shobun. However, in denying the plaintiff a hearing on
the validity or propriety of the governor's loan approval the court did
not mention, much less discuss, any of the problems surrounding the
public law-private law theory, nor did it cite any of the Japanese critics
of this distinction. 79 Perhaps the loan approval was proper and perhaps the plaintiff really had no justiciable interest that the court could
legally protect, but the court's rationale fails to present a persuasive
statement of the reasons for its dismissal.
In sum, with few exceptions, the Japanese courts appear willing
and able to use shobunsei to justify their dismissal of cases where no
concrete effect upon people's legal rights and duties can allegedly be
established. This willingness to delay adjudication of disputes may
well have serious ramifications for Japanese society.
III. SHOBUNSEI AS A BARRIER TO SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE
The prevailing view in Japan today appears to hold that the doctrine of shobunsei is not a barrier to substantive justice but simply a
means by which courts can decline review unless a concrete dispute is
at issue. According to this view, the courts will grant review only
when a citizen's natural liberties are affected by "imperative administrative action" rather than by "formative administrative action." 80
That is, administrative acts that restrict or invade preexisting rights or
76. Id at 103.
77. Id at 101.
78. See H6GAKU (Jurisprudence) 6-7 (S. Imamura & N. Koyama eds. 1965). See also
J. MERRYMAN, supra note 63, at 104-05.
79. See, ag., T. MiyAZAWA, K6H6 No GENRI (The Principles of Public Law) 3-29
(1967).
80. One Japanese scholar has analyzed this problem in the following terms:
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individual interests are not within the discretionary power of the
agency, even though administrative acts that confer new rights or
interests of individuals are. Correspondingly, although the courts can
determine specifically whether the nondiscretionary acts are supported
by law, they cannot review a discretionary action unless the agency
8
oversteps or abuses its discretionary power. '
The difficulty in this analysis, however, lies in determining the
existence and scope of the individual's "natural liberties," as well as of
his or her rights and duties. Under the rule of HayashiKen Shipbuilding, and Sasaki, supervisory orders, permissions, approvals, or regulations cannot be litigated because they do not directly create the rights
and duties of citizens.8 2 They are not imperative administrative
actions. Similarly, according to settled precedent and academic opinion, administrative suggestions, encouragement, guidance, and other
such expressions of opinion that have no direct legal effect upon a person's rights and duties are not proper subjects of administrative
83

litigation.

Yet, there can be little doubt that in cases like the Narita
Shinkansen Case, the plaintiffs did suffer harm because of the adminis-

trative action. In that former case, the land owners who lived within
the designated railroad corridor but whose land was not condemned
could never challenge the administrative action. The enjoyment of
The kind of connection that administrative action has toward private rights has
heretofore chiefly been discussed in connection with the "content of administrative
action," especially the effect of administrative action. That is to say, if we examine
the traditional theory (Tanaka, 1964 edition, p. 301, GY6SEI H6 SonoN), administrative action is distinguished in terms of its content between imperative administrative action (meireitekigydsei k) and formative administrative action (keiseiteki
gydsei k). Imperative administrative action is action to command such duties as
doing a specific act, not doing it, enduring it, and offering it; or administrative
action rescinding these duties. Those administrative actions are ones which have
as their object the "natuial liberty" that people originally enjoy, and by commanding duties, they limit natural liberty. And when they cancel duties they are said to
have the effect of restoring freedom that has been limited.
In contrast to this, formative administrative action is administrative action
toward people that establishes, changes, or destroys specific rights, the capacity to
possess rights, the capacity to perform legal rights, comprehensive legal statuses,
and other legal powers that are not naturally enjoyed. The result of this is that the
administrative agency grants or denies to other parties the legal power to oppose
the agency. Accordingly, formative administrative action and imperative administrative action are different. There are cases where public rights or other private
rights are established or cases where the results or private law legal actions are
completed or where there are other such results.
1 GYOSE H6 (Administrative Law) 151-52 (Yamada, Ichihara & Abe eds. 1979).
81. Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in Japan, 43 WASH. L. REv.
1075, 1085 (1968).
82. See Upham, supra note 5, at 236.
83. Ogawa, supra note 81. For a thoughtful, scholarly analysis of this issue, see Young,
JudicialReview of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 923 (1984).
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their property, however, was affected by the construction of the
railroad.
The Kubota decision offers a more extreme example. In that case,
the court completely glossed over the aspect of "concrete effect on
legal rights and duties" of shobunsei. It decided that the government's
action was not action by the government at all, or at least not by the
proper government official. The obvious reason for this switch in analysis is that a concrete effect on legal rights and duties was much more
apparent in that case, and therefore, a different type of rationale was
needed to avoid adjudication of the dispute.
The plaintiffs in Kubota sued the mayor for whom they had been
working, with whom they had had disagreements, and by whom they
had been transferred to different cities. Much to their surprise, the
mayor's action did not qualify as a shobun because the detachment
order did not completely detach the plaintiffs until the receiving
mayor signed an order officially assigning them to specific posts. The
plaintiffs should have sued the latter mayor. One cannot help but
wonder whether the court would not have reached a similar result if
the plaintiffs had sued the receiving mayor, because it was the transferring mayor's detachment order that had a concrete effect on the plaintiff's legal rights and duties, and it was his actions that were allegedly
motivated by personal ill-will against one of the plaintiffs. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of any argument that the
plaintiffs could have raised in order to attack the actions of the receiving mayor. Thus, they were left with no effective remedy against the
improperly motivated transfer.
Rigid application of shobunsei presents two problems. The first is
that individuals are unable to obtain judicial review of their claims
until very late in the administrative process. In NaritaShinkansen, for
example, the plaintiffs were unable to challenge the government construction until their houses were condemned. A legal challenge at that
late stage, however, may be worthless because many courts would be
reluctant, perhaps rightfully, to demolish millions of dollars of completed construction work. The net loss to society would arguably outweigh the gain to the individual plaintiff. If, however, a legal
challenge were allowed at an earlier stage, a more reasonable accommodation between public interest and private rights would probably
result, and shobunsei would be less of a barrier to substantive justice.
A second problem resulting from such rigid application of
shobunsei is that the administrative bureaucracy may become increasingly unresponsive to the public that it is intended to serve. Studies by
social scientists suggest that the discipline necessary for obtaining the
standardized behavior required in a bureaucratic organization will
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show "ritualistic" attitudes that will make officials unable to adjust
adequately to the problems they must solve.8 4 This discipline entails
the development of a strong esprit de corps at a group level and creates
a gap between the public and the bureaucracy. The behavioral rigidity, difficulties of adjustment to the task, and conflicts with the public
that exist within the bureaucracy then reinforce the need for control
85
and regulation.
In sum, bureaucracies suffer from a dysfunctional cycle that
causes isolation from and unresponsiveness to the public. Within a
bureaucratic organization, the rigidity of task definition, task arrangements, and the human relations network result in a lack of communication with the environment and a lack of communication among
groups. Individuals and groups use the resulting difficulties to
improve their positions in the power struggle within the organization,
because it is the active tendency of the human agent within the
bureaucracy to take advantage of all available means to further his
86
own privileges.
When this model of bureaucratic behavior is applied to the Japanese administrative system and the effect of the shobunsei doctrine
upon it, it is reasonable to conclude that administrative abuse follows.
By way of illustration, assume that a given bureaucratic organization,
the Ministry of Construction, has responsibility for supervising all
construction within Japan. Although the individual agents within the
Ministry seek by all available means to further their own personal
interests, they have been trained since childhood to a rigid conformity
that is augmented by the displacement of goals and by the adoption of
ritualistic attitudes inherent in bureaucratic discipline. These factors
cause the actors to develop a strong esprit de corps at a group level,
causing a gap between the public and the bureaucracy.
Let us also assume that there is a need for the construction of a
railroad line from Tokyo to Narita. The problem is referred to a particular group within the Ministry that is expert in the construction of
railroads. In addition to having the normal bureaucratic isolation and
group spirit just described, this group is even more narrow-minded
and caste-conscious because it is comprised of specialists. These spe84. This discussion is based upon M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON

178-94 (1964), and the studies cited therein.
85. This model of bureaucratic insularity prevails even when technical expertise, rather
than simple hierarchical control and standardization, is the operative norm of the bureaucracy. Specialization grows because decisions have to be made on neutral technical
grounds. Specialization, however, makes the experts more narrow-minded and caste-conscious while outside economic and social interests and pressures converge with their caste
policies. These dysfunctions naturally call for more specialization, and a new vicious circle
develops. Id. at 190-94.
86. Id. at 192-94.
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cialists then begin to work on the project, simultaneously trying to
further their personal advancement within the organization. Their
consideration of the problem is insulated from any public scrutiny or
comment because neither the ACLL nor other provisions of law generally allow for public input.
These bureaucrats then publish the plan, enter into contracts with
various construction companies (which are also bureaucracies and
compete with the Ministry "group" and the public), and send notices
to various landowners along the designated route stating what the
Ministry believes to be the boundaries of their land. None of the parties who live along the designated corridor, however, can challenge the
Ministry's decisions because none of these actions are justiciable
shobun under settled precedent.
In the meantime, however, the bureaucrats may realize that as
soon as they do make a legally cognizable shobun, they can be brought
into court. They also realize that their personal interests, as well as
the goals of their organization, are tied to the ultimate success of the
project. Judicial disapproval would, of course, be disastrous. In addition, it would hurt established relationships with the contractors.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that these bureaucrats will
take all necessary steps-such as preparing reports that unjustifiably
favor their position and destroying evidence damaging to their planto ensure the ultimate success of their plan and thus secure their
power. Indeed, such actions are typically taken by specialists.8 7 The
result is that when an administrative plan is finally reviewed by a
court, it is a fait accompli devoid of public input and deliberately
structured to make judicial revocation a virtual impossibility.
IV.

METHODS .OF ALLEVIATING THE SHOBUNSEI
BARRIERS: JAPANESE STATE REDRESS LAW
VERSUS AMERICAN JUDICIAL REVIEW

The two most noticeable results from the use of shobunsei by the
Japanese courts are first, that administrative agencies' adjudication of
infringement of individual rights is delayed until any judicial review
may be futile and second, that delay in adjudication reinforces bureaucratic isolation from the public and allows the bureaucracy sufficient
time to generate evidence in support of its actions. Hence, the ACLL
is not an effective means for reviewing administrative action.
87. Id. at 153. At least one Japanese case supports this contention. See Sh6nan Setsubi
K6gy6 Ltd. v. Mayor of Hiratsuka, 810 Hanrei jih6 3, 7 (Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 30, 1976).
In Yamaguchi v. Minister of Transport., 692 Hanrei jih6 30 (Hiroshima Dist. Ct. Jan. 17,
1973), the court conceded that adminstrative action tends to protect the parties who are
supposed to be regulated by the agencies rather than the public.
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A.

THE STATE REDRESS LAW

Many Japanese and others dismiss the ineffectiveness of the
ACLL in providing viable judicial review by asserting that the State
Redress Law88 negates any undesirable consequences of the shobunsei
doctrine. This article contends, however, that the State Redress Law
is no more effective in providing judicial review of administrative
action than is the ACLL.
The State Redress Law was enacted to effect the purposes of article 17 of the 1947 Constitution. "Every person may sue for redress as
provided by law from the state or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal acts of any public official." 8 9 Under the
State Redress Law, the state is liable generally for its negligent or wilful conduct 90 as well as for any defect in the management of public
facilities such as roads and rivers. 9 1
The most noted early case in which an allegedly illegal adminis-

92
trative action was challenged under this law is Tomabechi v. Japan.

In that case, the plaintiff was a member of the Diet when Prime Minis-

ter Yoshida dissolved the Diet without a Diet resolution. The plaintiff
failed in his effort to have this action reviewed by the courts, 93 and in

the subsequent elections the plaintiff lost his bid for reelection. He
then sued under the State Redress Law for compensation for the salary he would have received as a Diet member had no election been

held pursuant to the dissolution order. Although the Tokyo District
Court found in his favor, both the Tokyo High Court and the Supreme
Court dismissed his claim on appeal because of the political question
doctrine. In the years since Tomabechi, damage actions have often
been used to review administrative actions indirectly, 94 under the
88. State Redress Law (Kokka baish5 ho), Law No. 125 of 1947. See J. Haley, supra
note 4, at 20-21.
89. JAPAN CONST. art. 17.

90.
91.
92.
93.

State Redress Law, art. 1.
Id at art. 2.
14 Minshfi 1206 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 8, 1960).
Tomabechi v. Japan, 7 Minshii 305 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 15, 1953), translated in J.

MAKI, COURT AND CONSrnITiON IN JAPAN 366 (1964).

94. For example, between 1950 and 1979, over 400 lower court decisions were reported
under this law, with the plaintiffs winning a far larger proportion than in administrative
suits. J. Haley, supra note 4, at 21. In comparison, 96 suits were newly filed under the
ACLL in 1979. A total of 117 cases were resolved and 491 cases remained pending. The
117 that were resolved were resolved in the following manner: there were 71 decisions, the
claim was recognized in whole or part in 17 cases, and rejected in 54 cases. A ruling or
order was issued in 1 case; 4 cases went to conciliation; and 41 cases were withdrawn or
otherwise settled. 32 H6s5 jihb 152 (1980). As for kdso appeals of administrative suits in
the same year, there were 46 new filings. Out of a total of 30 cases resolved, 25 cases went
to decision, with the appellate tribunal issuing a decision in 7 and dismissing the appeal in
18. One case went to conciliation, and 4 cases were withdrawn or otherwise settled.
Ninety-two cases remained pending. Id. at 153.

58

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:37

belief that the State Redress Law rather than the ACLL will produce
changes in the behavior of administrative agencies. 95
An example of a damage suit under the State Redress Law caus96
ing the desired administrative action is Hosono v. City of Kashima.

In that case, the plaintiff wanted to become a pollution engineer for
the local government in Kashima-cho, Ibaragi Prefecture, because a
large industrial complex was located there. He took and passed a first

examination in October 1975, and with fourteen other people, took a
second examination in December 1975. The plaintiff believed that he
had done well on the exams, and in fact, a high-ranking Kashima-cho
official told a friend of the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be hired.

An investigation of this matter by an environmental group with
which the plaintiff was affiliated showed that the labor union, which
had had a disagreement with the plaintiff's group about the strategy of
the pollution movement two years earlier, pressured the city not to
hire the plaintiff. After a trial, the district court found the city liable

to the plaintiff for one million yen in compensatory damages.
Kashima-cho appealed this award, and upon the high court's recommendation to settle the case, the plaintiff gave up his damages award
and Kashima-cho hired the plaintiff.

Although the plaintiff in Hosono successfully used the State
Redress Law to obtain a reversal of the administrative action, this
result is fairly rare. Moreover, this kind of result will probably continue to be the exception rather than the rule for the same reasons that
arguably bias litigation under the ACLL in favor of the administra-

tion, i.e. bureaucratic mindset. It has been shown that agents within
bureaucratic organizations prepare documents favorable to their posi-

tion and destroy, hide, or alter documents unfavorable to their position 97-indeed,

that is exactly what happened in Hosono. Because of

this tendency, judicial review of administrative action under either
These statistics show that at the district court level, the plaintiffs who went to trial were
successful only about one-third of the time and that almost as many cases were withdrawn
as were dismissed (41 versus 54). On appeal, 72% of the cases were dismissed and 28%
were decided by the higher court without a remand. Because the terms of the withdrawal
or settlement vary among the substantial number of cases in which a withdrawal or settlement occurred (about 40% of all cases resolved at the trial level were withdrawn or settled), one cannot draw any conclusions about the success of plaintiffs from those cases.
Based upon the statistics in which a court decision was issued, however, it is safe to say that
plaintiffs were not very successful.
95. This belief has support in more than a few cases. See the SMON (Subacute-MyeloOptics Neuropathy) drug cases, e.g., Yagi v. Japan, 879 Hanreljih5 26 (Kanazawa Dist. Ct.
Mar. 1, 1978) against the Ministry of Health and Welfare under the State Redress Law for
injuries due to the use of the drug dioquinol. The damages awarded against the state in just
one of these cases was well over $6 million. It is reasonable to expect the Japanese government to become more responsive to its citizens when the courts award damages like these.
96. 999 Hanrei jih6 118 (Miho Dist. Ct., Nov. 20, 1980).
97. See M. CROZIER, supra note 84, at 153.
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ACLL or the State Redress Law can attain a full and impartial knowledge of the relevant facts only to the extent that the agency is inept in
covering its tracks, as in Hosono, or so short-sighted that it fails to take
such steps. In short, if an agency is not inept, it is very difficult under
Japanese law for an injured citizen to obtain effective judicial relief
from allegedly illegal administrative action.
B.

THE U.S. APPROACH

Because U.S. administrative law principles initially were very
similar to current Japanese administrative law principles, the changes
in the U.S. methods of combating bureaucratic tyranny provide an
instructive contrast.
The first U.S. method-the traditional one-was to allow judicial
review of administrative actions because it was believed that the combination of legislative supervision, popular opinion, and bureaucratic
tradition were inadequate to ensure a tolerable degree of agency compliance with legislative directives. 98 Judicial review was made available
as an additional assurance that agencies did not exceed their authorized powers. 99 The difficulty inherent in judicial review of administrative action, however, lies in judicial competence. Judges seldom have
the training necessary to resolve difficult factual questions or to evaluate the legitimacy of inferences from the facts. 1°°
Over time, U.S. courts took two opposing approaches to this
problem. The first was to defer to agency action. Such deference
could still be seen sporadically in the early 1970s. 10 1 The second, and
increasingly frequent, response, however, was vigorous substantive
judicial review. In comparison to the Japanese practice, the most
notable feature of substantive review is that it occurs at a comparatively early stage in the administrative process.
Many of the Japanese cases involving pre-enforcement challenges
to administrative regulations would be decided differently under the
U.S. standard of standing even though that standard is admittedly
applied inconsistently. This standard, despite its inconsistent applica98. See Fleming v. Moberly Milk Prod. Co., 160 F.2d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See
generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1669 (1975); Note, Regulatory Analyses and JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, 91
YALE L.J. 739 (1982). The following discussion largely draws upon these works.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 489
(1942).
100. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The
Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 393 (1974).
101. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding denial of bank
charter despite minimal and conclusory explanation of rule); United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1972) (upholding rule promulgated by ICC by
employing highly deferential standard of review).
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tion permitting the courts to take or reject a case on arguably irreconcilable grounds, 10 2 generally requires that the litigant need not

demonstrate more than injury in fact and the substantial likelihood
that the judicial relief requested would prevent or redress the injury
claimed.10 3 When this standard is compared to the Japanese shobunsei

standard, the conclusion is that judicial review can occur much earlier
in U.S. administrative process.
For example, if the U.S. standard had been used in the Narita
Shinkansen case, it is likely that the court would have granted review
of the plan because its effect upon the landowners living within the

designated corridor would have caused significant hardship to them.
In addition to adversely affecting the local environment, the railroad

would no doubt have seriously affected property values within and
along the corridor. In declining to review the plan, however, the Japanese court never began to consider "the hardship to the parties of

withholding consideration." It is in this respect that the U.S. and Japanese systems differ most.

The second response which the U.S. legal system developed to
counter bureaucratic isolation and unresponsiveness was to allow for

public involvement in the rule-making process. 104 The central feature
is publication of proposed rules in the Federal Register, with an invitation to interested parties to make written comments. The agency's
staff then considers the comments and revises the rules. The rules are

then published but do not become effective for thirty days after publication. Thus, further protests can be directed to the final version. The
results show that this process is generally effective. As one noted
102. At first, the Supreme Court held that declaratory orders and formal findings were
not ripe for review. See Shanahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938); United States v.
Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927). Later, however, the Court
allowed such a review. In the seminal case of Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351
U.S. 40 (1956), the Court reviewed an ICC determination that certain of the products
carried by the plaintiff were not agricultural commodities falling within a statutory exemption to ICC jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's holding that the
order was unreviewable because it did not command anything to be done. The Court reasoned that the ICC determination was not abstract, theoretical, or academic; rather, it was
a declaratory order "which touches vital interests of carriers and shippers alike and sets the
standard for shaping the manner in which an important segment of the trucking business
will be done." Id at 44. Under this type of reasoning, several of the Japanese cases this
Article discusses, e.g., Hayashi Ken Shipbuilding, would have different results.
103. A doctrine closely tied to standing, and one that often is difficult to distinguish, is
ripeness. As with standing, the standard for ripeness in adminstrative litigation in the
United States is considerably more liberal than in Japan. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories,
Inc. v. Garder, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (upholding pre-enforcement review of a food and drug
regulation requiring that the established name accompany each appearance of a proprietary
name on labels and advertisements because the regulation had a significant direct and
immediate impact).
104. Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act delineates the rulemaking procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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author writes, "The procedure is both fair and efficient. Much experience shows it works beautifully. Good agencies are more and more
tending to use this rulemaking procedure even when they are not
10°5
required to."
If these two procedures for constraining administrative actiongreater judicial review of all administrative action, including rulemaking, and public involvement in the rulemaking process-were available
in Japan, most of the inequities that we have seen resulting from the
10 6
application of the shobunsei doctrine would probably disappear.
Also, if the early public involvement and judicial review in the administrative process that is found in the U.S. system were possible in
Japan, the bureaucratic infighting that occurred in Kubota or the foreseeable injury to the reputation of the shipbuilding company in
Hayashi Ken would have been avoided.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing review of the shobunsei doctrine shows that
although access to judicial review of administrative action has become
more available since the Tokugawa era, judicial review has not been
very effective in resolving conflicts between administrative agencies
and citizens. Leading theories of bureaucratic behavior and the development of U.S. administrative law system show that in order to
counter bureaucratic isolation and the resulting disregard for public
concern, it is necessary to allow public involvement in, and judicial
review of, administrative action at an earlier stage than is currently
possible in Japan.
There is no single reason why Japan has not developed a more
effective system for early judicial review of administrative action. Perhaps it is because government administrators, as heirs to the samurai,10 7 have benefited from a residual respect of the "commoners" for
their superiors. Any such deference, however, is augmented by several
more concrete reasons. First, Japanese judicial review of administrative action is generally by a trial de novo.10 8 Therefore, if a Japanese
court does not dismiss a case brought under ACLL, a full trial occurs,
and, given the possibility that the first trial alone will take up to ten
105. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 139 (3d ed. 1972).
106. As one scholar has noted, the practical effect of the shobunsei doctrine "is to postpone judicial scrutiny until the policy is implemented rather than to make it available at the
planning stage when the review would be most effective." Upham, supra note 5, at 238.
107. Craig, Functionaland DysfunctionalAspects of Government Bureaucracy,in MODERN JAPANESE ORGANIZATION AND DECISION-MAKING 3, 4 (E. Vogel ed. 1975).
108. Hashimoto, supra note 13, at 261.
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years 09 (not to mention two appeals of right), that imposes a significant burden upon both the agency and the court. Second, Japanese
judges are much less inclined than their U.S. counterparts to create
law. They feel themselves closely bound by statutory provisions in the
field of administrative law and are unlikely to develop innovative interpretations of a statute to handle a particular problem.1 0 Finally, statutory and case law concerning administrative procedure is still

undeveloped."'

As Japanese social scientists, lawyers, and legal

scholars develop a greater understanding of the dangers to a democ-

racy posed by unfettered administrative action, perhaps the situation
will change.

109. See, eg., Ino, Diary of a Plaintiffs'Attorneys'Team in the ThalidomideLitigation, 8
LAW IN JAPAN 136 (1975).

110. Id. at 270-71. But see Young, Administrative Guidancein the Courts: A Case Study
in DoctrinalAdaptation, 17 LAW iN JAPAN 120, 121 (1984) (Japanese administrative law
practice after World War II has been strongly influenced by American practices and procedures; "Japanese judges may attempt simply to replicate what they consider to be the foreign result.")
111. Id at 271.

